in Maya terms, its Katun anniversary of twenty years. During these twenty years, the occasion has never arisen for me to speak in public about the book. Being. a man not prone to autobiography, and who will go out of his way to avoid looking in a mirror, I have paid little attention to the reception of the book. Here, however, on this anniversary, I hope to look back over the reviews, to note the changes in the book's public and its author. I was surprised, while I was preparing this lecture, to notice how, among my friends who had read the book, a division into two groups appeared. Both groups are equally discerning and educated and, as far as I can tell, equal in numbers. One group is eager to say that they don't understand a word of it, and there are artists and historians among them. Those of the other group declare that they understand it all on first reading, without difficulty. Of course I believe them both, without knowing the combination that separates them so sharply. Perhaps distinctive and contrasting features in their comprehension of works of art are responsible. What I say speaks to some, but not to others. Some are ready and others are not. But when both someday find that they agree in understanding it, that day may be its last as a book alive in the dissension over its intelligibility. In what follows, it seems best to limit my remarks to printed reviews and essays that are more in disagreement than in accord with the book. In this way the more searching objections to my argument are chosen.
Priscilla Colt then provides a summary of the book so concise that I have nothing to change in it, nor would I do it better. A close paraphrase of her analysis of the essential content is in order for those who have not read the book. She speaks first of seriation and change, then of time, and then of duration.
As to their seriation, works of art, like tools and inventions, are (among other things) purposeful solutions to problems. Once the problem is identified, the various solutions-which compose a class of forms-reveal themselves as related to one another in a temporal sequence-which is the formal sequence.
Change occurs in linked sequences or series, depending on whether viewed from within or without, respectively. Change seems to obey a rule of series, although interferences from images and meanings may distort the process. Within each sequence, prime objects and vast masses of replicas are to be discovered. Prime objects, described as inventions possessing prime traits, remotely comparable to mutant genes, are capable of generating change. They result in copies and variants, which also generate change through minute variants.
The propagation of things is carried on through invention and replication in time. Duration has different rates. It cuts into different lengths, and it displays different kinds of shapes.
Although cultural history has no adequate theory of time, a distinction is apparent between fast and slow happening. Thus artistic careers interrelate with societal phases: the full range of artistic careers can unfold only in metropolitan conditions. There a wide selection of active sequences is available. These make fast happening possible. At the other extreme, slow happening or casual drift occurs in provincial or tribal settings, where nonprofessionals and artisans engage in routine and repetitive actions.
Durations follow several different shapes. Another of her questions is whether style is precluded by sequences in time. My opinion that style is instantaneous, or synchronic, rather than diachronic, has been extended in an article that appeared in 1979.2 Priscilla Colt is also disturbed by ghostly "prime objects," which cannot be found and whose existence to me is no more tangible than that of the particles of nuclear physics, known only by the disturbances they cause. This concept of the prime object has puzzled many readers, and questions about it are more frequent than about any other aspect.
In theory, being originally in the maker's mind, no prime object exists in its pristine state. They all have been altered in actuality, and they suffer the accidents of time, being known only by indirection, like stars vanishing in supernova explosions. This sounds like astrophysics, which is a field thickly populated with radical theories that are beyond proof. Black holes were first named by Archibald Wheeler in 1973. These are small, superdense stellar corpses, which destroy matter by gravitational dissolution, removing information from the universe. Their opposites, however, are white holes, from which new matter erupts, endowed with color, texture, and chemical composition. Their existence as mathematical creatures, or objects, was first postulated in 1964, and today white holes are regarded as time-reversed black holes, renewing the universe, although none has ever been registered by observation, however indirect. They are prefigured, however, in the Manichaean universe of light springing from darkness.
Thus, my idea about prime objects is less mathematical and more historical than white holes, but, like them, prime objects may be constructs necessary to understanding the processes which they may have originated. to my discussion of pre-Columbian art, which I will take up later.
Another of my respected critics is
Bialostocki's main difference with me is over the importance of iconographic studies. Then and now morphology has occupied a minor role in art history, where it has been seen as the "mere formalism" of iconographers and social historians who were more interested in writing history with images than in discovering the intrinsic languages of those images. Yet, these discoveries require morphological as well as iconographical analysis. Later in the 1960's it began to appear that meanings could be extracted from archaeological finds, even when no written texts are known from their own time.5 Since then, the belief that morphology and iconography require simultaneous study has gained wider acceptance, for the determination of intended meaning emerges from exact formal description as much as from the writings of a particular time. Visual form is intrinsic, whereas written evidence is adherent and extrinsic.
Boris Joyce Brodsky is a historian of medieval and modern art who rejects "simple forms of positivism" and the "prevalent cyclical-biological evolutionary system of analysis." She considers my work to be a scheme of "art as a system of formal relations like a language."'0 She also sees it as paralleling, in her words, "semiotics and structuralism in their attempts to correlate all human patterns into a system of intelligible signs."
Her main criticism is with my use of the words "convention" and "invention," for which she would substitute "continuity" and "discontinuity," instead. This, she claims, would avoid the pejorative connotation of "convention" and would free artistic invention from what she calls "association with inventions or useful objects." Her wish is to center both method and theory, as she says, "in the inherent conservatism not only endemic to all cultures, periods, schools, but to individual style as well." I would agree, but only to the point at which tradition invites dissent, perhaps in the eighteenth century. Thereafter it would be unhistorical to overlook the polarity between convention and invention in the history of European art. Their appreciation may be related to their being released, as artists, from the rigid hierarchies enshrined by the textbook industry or, as it was once expressed, the "pigeon-holes of art history."
The late Ad Reinhardt, who was exceptional in committing his opinions to the printed page, wrote an article which is more about artists than about historians.'2 He began with two premises. First, "every artist, fine or free," as he put it, has to know and forget art history in favor of "art-as-art"; and, second, art history as taught in our "university-academies" has something wrong with it. Reinhardt then asks twenty-eight questions dealing with his idea of the failure of the history of art. In one he asks how it should be taught; in others he inquires about true and false arts. Another query concerns "post-historic" art. Twentieth-century art and the reassessment it enforces of both past and future art are uppermost in his mind. He is also concerned about the neglect of non-European.art by today's artists. 
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